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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH I

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
BERNARD

Case No.
15714

SANDOVAL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant and two co-defendants were charged with the
crime of aggravated robbery in violation of Section 76-6-302,
Utah Code Annotated (19 5 3) •
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant and both co-defendants were tried jointly on
January 12-13, 1978, before a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County.

All were found guilty

of the crime of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony.

Appellant was sentenced to a term of five years to
life, placed on probation, and granted a stay of execution
of sentence.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction on the basis
that the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for
severance and/or mistrial and motion for a new trial constituted
prejudicial error.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and co.-defendants Carter and Morishita were
charged with having committed the crime of ac;rgravated robber.on or about the 31st day of March, 1977.
The three were brought to trial jointly on January 12,
1978.

At the close of the State's case, counsel for appellar:'

rested his case, not having called appellant to the stand.
Subsequently, during his opening statement, counsel for
codefendant Morishita claimed he would call appellant Sandova:,
to the stand to testify and attempted to state what he though:
Sandoval would say, at which point appellant's counsel objects,
The Court sustained the objection and admonished the jury to '
disregard the matter, pointing out that a defendant could
not be called to the stand involuntarily.
A conference was held at side bar during which the
court informed counsel for Morishita he could not call
Sandoval as a witness and that the statements of Sandoval
he wished to elicit were inadmissible under the attorneyclient privilege.
Counsel fO:E' Morishita completed his opening statement,
was directed to call his first witness, and, in front of the
jury, he called co-defendant Sandoval.

Appellant's counsel

again objected and the objection was sustained.

He then

moved for a mistrial and/or severance, and the motion was
denied.
Counsel for appellant later argued a motion for a new

trial
which
was Funding
also for
denied.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO REFUSE TO TESTIFY
IS ABSOLUTE AND CANNOT BE USED AGAINST
HIM IN ANY MANNER.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States, and the Cons ti tut ion of the State of
Utah, guarantee to a defendant the right to refuse to testify
in any criminal proceeding against him.
Further, Section 77-44-5, Utah Code Annoated,
states that a defendant's

11
•••

(1953)

neglect or refusal to be a

witness shall not in any manner prejudice him or be used
against him on the trial or proceeding.

11

(emphasis added.)

The policy underlying such a guarantee is sound in that
a defendant ought not to be required, in any way, to aid the
State in establishing its burden of proof, nor should his
exercise of the privilege be used to his detriment.
The issue of a defendant's testimonial privilege is
especially poignant in the setting of a joint trial, where a
defense attorney's zeal on behalf of his client may lead him
to attempt to elicit exculpatory testimony from a co-defendant.
Such an attempt could well serve to prejudice the interest of
a co-defendant who refuses to testify.
The case of United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892
(7th Cir. 1965), clearly delineates the problem.

In Echeles,

an attorney appealed his conviction of suborning perjury,

~peding administration of justice and conspiracy.
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Echeles was tried jointly with a co-defendant by the
name of Arrington.

Echeles was faced with the ?roblem of

being unable to call Arrington as a witness because of a
defendant's testimonial privilege, while needing to enter
into evidence admissions made by Arrington which would have
exculpated Echeles.
In discussing the scope of the Fifth Arnendement, the
Court in Echeles stated:
By its first and most familiar
protection, this Fifth Amendment
provision gives any person the
right to refuse to answer questions
which might tend to incriminate him.
But equally important is the
'universally held' interpretation
of this right prohibiting any person
who is on trial for a crime from being
called to the witness stand.
352
F.2d at 897 (emphasis is original)
Concerning the right to refuse to testify, the Court
states further at 897:
The second protection applies
without regard to the nature of the
intended inquiry; that is, a
defendant on trial cannot be
required to take the stand to answer
even the most innocuous, nonincriminating inquiries.
Nor does
it make a difference whether the
defendant is called to the stand
by the prosecution or a co-defendant.
Clearly, a defendant's right to refuse to testify is
absolute, whether he be tried jointly or separately.

Thus,

in the instant case, the court's sustaining of appellant' 5
objections and the admonition to the jury were !Jroper and
essential.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL
AND/OR SEVERANCE AND FOR A NEN
TRIAL CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR.
The central issue involved in the instant case is
whether appellant was prejudiced by the statements and conduct
of counsel for defendant Morishita so as to deny appellant due
process of law, despite the sustaining of objections by
appellant's attorney and the Court's admonition to the jury.
Perhaps the mere mention of the intention to call
appellant by Morishita' s attorney during his opening statement was insufficient to prejudice appellant's position.

The

admonition to the jury to disregard the matter may have cured
the prejudice.
However, certainly the actual calling of appellant by
counsel for Morishita, after he was instructed not to do so,
focused the attention of the jury on the implications of a
defendant's refusal to testify as surely as if a direct
comment on such failure were to be made by counsel.

At that

point, a motion for mistrial and severance should have been
granted.

Case law clearly favors severance in the interest of

justice, fairness and impartiality.
The case of DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140
(5th Cir. 1962), reh. denied 324 F.2d 375 (1963), involved
two defendants tried jointly for violations of the Narcotic
Drug Import and Export Act.

Each had retained his own
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attorney.

At trial, De Luna did not take the stand, but

n~s

co-defendant Gomez did testify.
Counsel for Gomez, in his closing argument, commen:e:
directly on DeLuna's failure to testify and had
an indirect reference.

earlier~~

Counsel for DeLuna objected and

t~

trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the matter.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the case for separate trials, stating:
If an attorney's duty to his
client should require him to draw
the jury's attention to the possible
inference of guilt from a codefendant' s silence, the trial
judge's duty is to order that the
defendants be tried separately.
308 F. 2d at 141.
While DeLuna involved a direct comment on a co-defendr:
failure to testify, the rationale underlying the

sever~~

requirement applies with equal force to the instant case.
The effect upon the impartiality of a jury is the same wheth;
it derives from a direct comment as in DeLuna or from an
indirect source as in appellant's case.
In Echeles, supra., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appea.
in holding that Echeles' motion for severance should have
been granted, considered the prejudicial effect of calling
a co-defendant to testify (citing DeLuna in support thereof:
Thus, Echeles could not properly
call Arrington as a witness during
Echeles' case in chief.
For if
Arrington declined to take the stand,
as was his right, Echeles' action in
calling him and forcing him to decline
to do so in front of the jury would
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have injected prejudicial
error into the record as to
Arrington.
352 F.2d at 898.
In United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir.
1973), the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's

conviction for distributing cocaine and denied defendant's
claim that he be allowed to interrogate a former co-defendant
where such co-defendant would apparently invoke his Fifth
Amendment privileges.

The Court stated at 1211:

"Finally, we find without merit
the claim that Johnson had a right
to have Perry called as a witness
before the jury.
(citations
omitted)
If it appears that a
witness intends to claim the
privilege as to essentially all
questions, the court may, in its
discretion, refuse to allow him
to take the stand. Neither side
has the right to benefit from any
inferences the jury may draw simply
from the witness' assertion of the
privilege either alone or in conjunction with questions that have
been put to him."
POINT III
THE ERRORS RAISED HEREIN CONCERN
A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AND ARE PRESUMED TO BE PREJUDICIAL.
Due to the trial court's refusal to sever or grant a
motion for a new trial, appellant was denied a fundamental
constitutional right--the right to be tried by an impartial

jury.
The inference to be drawn from appellant's refusal to
take the stand after being called by counsel for Morishita
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can only have influenced the jury adversely and 9rejudicial[':
as to appellant.
When a fundamental constitutional right has been abused
or denied, any error pertaining thereto is presumed to be
prejudicial.

The Supreme Court of Utah adopted this position

in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970),
stating:
We think the correct view, and
the one which is both practical
and in keeping with the desired
objective of fundamental fairness
and due process of law, is that
there is a presumption that such
error is prejudicial, but that it
can be overcome when the court
is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that it had no such prejudicial
effect upon the proceedings.
468
P.2d at 643.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the same
standard in the case of Martinez v. Turner, 461 F.2d 261
(10th Cir. 1972), stating:
Before a Federal constitutional
error can be held harmless, the
court must be able to declare a
belief that i t was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
461 F.2d at 265.
In the case at bar, appellant was denied a trial by an
impartial jury and the errors pertaining thereto must be
presumed to be prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
The compelling weight of authority favors a severance
in circumstances such as those in the case at bar.

A

co!11111on

theme throughtout the cases cited is the prejudicial effect
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In the case at bar, no amount of admonishing the jury
could purge the prejudicial effect upon appellant of the
statements and conduct of counsel for Morishita.

In fact,

further admonitions to the jury might only have exacerbated
the problem.
If the requirement of Section 77-44-5, Utah Code
Mnoated,

(1953), that a defendant's refusal to testify "shall

not in any manner prejudice him or be used against him," is
to be given meaning, then appellant's motion for a new trial
should have been granted and appellant is entitled to a
reversal.
DATED this

/,JJ1,aay of September, 1978.

Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for Appellant
72 East Fourth South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

/
.1 /
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Attorney General's Office,
at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah this

/3iJi..aayof

September, 1978.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-10Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

